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Constitutional L~W-FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIONSTATE 
MAY REQUIRE A PHOTOGRAPH ON A DRIVERS LICENSE THOUGH THE 
LICENSEE'S RELIGIOUS BELIEFS PROHIBIT PHOTOGRAPHS OF ANY 
TYPE--Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 
1979). 
The plaintiffs in Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Diuisionl were 
members of the Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA, a small religious 
group located in Pueblo, Colorado. Their religion teaches that 
photographs are graven images and therefore forbids the taking 
of photographs.' As a result, when the plaintiffs applied for Col- 
orado driving permits they refused to allow their photographs to 
be taken.' Since the state statute required a photograph on each 
driving permit: the Motor Vehicle Division refused to issue per- 
mits to them.Vn Johnson, Assembly members attacked the 
state's application of the photograph requirement to them as a 
violation of their constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion? 
The first amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise" of religion.' In Reynolds v. United States: the Su- 
preme Court first announced that beliefs but not actions were 
1. 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979). 
2. Id. at 1363. The Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA derives this doctrine from a lit- 
eral interpretation of Exodus 20:4 that states: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth 
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth." See also Deuteronomy 5:8. 
3. 593 P.2d at 1364. 
4. "Every application for a driver's, minor driver's, or provisional driver's license, 
and the license issued as a result of said application, shall also contain the photograph of 
the applicant or licensee. Such photograph shall be taken and processed with equipment 
leased or owned by the department." COLO. REV. STAT. 5 42-2-106(3) (1973). 
5. 593 P.2d at 1364. 
6. Assembly members claimed that the photograph requirement violates their right 
to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by both the first amendment of the United 
States Constitution and article 11, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution. Id. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free exercise clause of the first amendment was made 
wholly applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwe11 v. Con- 
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
8. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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protected by the free exercise clause? Later, in Cantwell v. Con- 
necticut,1° the Court again considered the scope of the free exer- 
cise clause and concluded that religious conduct as well as belief 
may be protected in appropriate  circumstance^.^^ 
Since Cantwell, courts have struggled with the question of 
when religiously motivated conduct can be circumscribed by the 
government and have necessarily resorted to a balancing test." 
Two important Supreme Court decisions, Sherbert v. VernerlS 
and Braunfeld v. Brown," illustrate the difficulty in applying a 
balancing test to delicate free exercise clause issues. 
A. The Sherbert Test 
A particularly difficult issue to resolve arises when a govern- 
ment regulation does not require an individual to act contrary to 
his religious belief but conditions the receipt of benefits on such 
conduct. In Sherbert, a South Carolina statute provided that an 
unemployed person's failure to accept suitable work rendered 
the claimant ineligible for unemployment benefits." The state 
Employment Security Commission determined that Sherbert's 
refusal to work Saturdays, even though motivated by religious 
beliefs, placed her within the disqualifying provision.16 
In determining whether the imposition of such a burden on 
religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause, the United 
States Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test. In order to 
justify the burden placed on Sherbert, the state had to show (1) 
that the compelling state interests served by the regulation out- 
weighed the burden imposed, and (2) that no less burdensome 
alternative forms of regulation existed to achieve the state inter- 
ests.'' In applying this two-pronged test, the Court determined 
9. The Court a r m e d  a bigamy conviction of a Mormon despite his claim that the 
practice of plural marriage constituted a basic tenet of his faith. The Court stated that 
"[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with 
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. 
10. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
11. Id. at 303-04. 
12. For an examination of the balancing test as applied by the courts in weighing 
religious liberty claims against various governmental regulations that promote health, 
safety, morals, or welfare, see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishrnent, and Doc- 
trinal Development, 80 HAW. L. REV. 1381 (1967). 
13. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
14. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
15. 374 U.S. at 400-01. 
16. Id. at 401. 
17. Id. at 406-07. 
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that even if compelling state interests were found, the state had 
failed to satisfy the second prong of its burden." Focusing on 
whether an acceptable alternative form of regulation existed, the 
Court decided that granting an exemption to Sherbert consti- 
tuted an adequate alternative since an exemption would not in- 
terfere with the state interests served by the unemployment 
statute.'@ Consequently, to condition the availability of unem- 
ployment benefits upon Sherbert's willingness to violate a cardi- 
nal principle of her religious faith violated the free exercise 
In Braunfeld v. Brown, a case similar to Sherbert but de- 
cided two years earlier, the Court applied the same test to reach 
a different result. Orthodox Jews claimed that compliance with 
Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law placed them at an economic 
disadvantage because their religious beliefs required them to 
also close on Saturday, their Sabbath." Although the Court rec- 
ognized the economic burden on the Jewish merchants because 
of their religious beliefs, it upheld the validity of the statute." 
The state satisfactorily met its two-pronged burden by demon- 
strating that the statute furthered the important secular goal of 
one uniform day of rest and that this goal could not be achieved 
by less burdensome means." 
Recognizing the apparent inconsistency between its decision 
in Braunfeld and its decision in Sherbert, the Sherbert Court 
attempted to distinguish the two cases. First, it examined the 
nature of the burden imposed on the Sabbatarians by the re- 
spective regulatory schemes? In Braunfeld, the Sunday closing 
law imposed a lesser burden upon religious practice in that ob- 
servance of the Jewish Sabbath only resulted in one extra day of 
lost profits? In Sherbert, however, the burden resulted in the 
termination of Sherbert's sole source of income during her 
unemployment. 
Although this distinction focusing on the extent of the reli- 
gious burden imposed cannot be overlooked, perhaps the great- 
est difference between Sherbert and Braunfeld concerns the 
18. Id. at 407-09. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 410. 
21. 366 U.S. at 601. 
22. Id. at 609. 
23. Id. at 608. 
24. 374 U.S. at 408. 
25. See id. 
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presence or absence of less burdensome  alternative^.'^ The stat- 
utes in neither case would constitute a religious burden when 
applied to the vast majority of people. Consequently, in deter- 
mining whether adequate alternatives existed, the Court consid- 
ered whether providing an exemption for Sabbatarians consti- 
tuted an alternative. In making this inquiry the Court focused 
on the impact an exemption would have on the overall statutory 
In Braunfeld, the Court determined that the state's interest 
in providing one uniform day of rest could only be achieved by 
declaring Sunday to be that day of rest." To grant an exemption 
to Sabbatarians "appeared to present an administrative problem 
of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a 
competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have ren- 
dered the entire statutory scheme unw~rkable.'"~ 
In Sherbert, on the other hand, the Court decided that the 
state did not establish that an exemption would undermine the 
purposes of the statute.s0 In support of its decision, the Court 
observed that the statutory scheme automatically exempted 
those whose religious views prohibited Sunday work.s1 The 
Court also noted that other states granted unemployment bene- 
fits to persons unable to find suitable employment because of a 
religious prohibition against Saturday work." Therefore, an ex- 
emption for Sherbert provided an acceptable alternative. 
B. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer 
In Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of 
26. That there was disagreement among the Justices concerning which statutory 
scheme imposed a greater burden on the respective Sabbatarians suggests that other 
factors may have been more pivotal in distinguishing Sherbert from Braunfeld. In the 
dissenting opinion in Sherbert, Justices Harlan and White stated that 
[fjorcing a store owner to close his business on Sunday may well have the ef- 
fect of depriving him of a satisfactory livelihood if his religious convictions re- 
quire him to close on Saturday as well. Here we are dealing only with tempo- 
rary benefits, amounting to a fraction of regular weekly wages and running for 
not more that 22 weeks. 
Id. at 421. 
27. 374 U.S. at  408-09. 
28. Id. at  408. 
29. Id. at  408-09 (footnote omitted). 
30. Id. at  409. 
31. Id. at  406. 
32. Id. at  407 n.7. 
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Prayer,33 the Indiana Supreme Court employed the Sherbert 
test and the impact-of-an-exemption form of analysis to deter- 
mine whether the photograph requirement for driving permits 
unconstitutionally infringed upon the applicant's free exercise of 
religion.34 Members of the Pentecostal House of Prayer, believ- 
ing photographs to be graven images,g5 refused to be photo- 
graphed when they applied for driving licenses and therefore 
were not issued permits." The court found that enforcement of 
the state's photograph requirement infringed upon the free exer- 
cise of the Pentecostals' religious beliefs since it forced them to 
choose between an important religious principle and their right 
to drive?' 
In defense of its photograph requirement, the state ad- 
vanced two interests served by its practice: (1) the state's inter- 
est in assuring the competency of Indiana drivers is achieved by 
constantly checking each driver's knowledge, ability and obedi- 
ence, and (2) the photograph requirement gives the state a 
means of rapid, positive identification in furthering highway 
safety.38 
Although the court agreed that the state has a strong inter- 
est in assuring driver competence, it stressed that having one's 
photograph on a drivers license does not in any way affect driv- 
ing competen~e.~~ An individual must satisfy the same standards 
of competence to receive a drivers license regardless of whether 
the license includes a photograph. 
The court found the interest in speedy identification to be 
more persuasive but nevertheless granted relief to the Pentecos- 
tal members since the state had not shown the absence of less 
33. 269 Ind. 361, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (1978). 
34. Id. at 362-63, 380 N.E.2d at  1226. 
35. Id. The Pentecostal House of Prayer follows a literal interpretation of Deuteron- 
omy 5:8 which provides: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any like- 
ness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the 
water beneath the earth." See also Exodus 20:4. 
36. 269 Ind. at 362-63, 380 N.E.2d a t  1226. 
Every such permit or license shall bear thereon the distinguishing number as- 
signed to the permittee or licensee and shall contain the name, age, residence 
address, a brief description, and, with the exception of a learner's permit, a 
photograph of such person for the purpose of identification, and such addi- 
tional information as the commissioner shall deem necessary, also a space for 
the signature of the permittee or licensee. 
IND. CODE 5 9-1-4-37(b) (1976). 
37. 269 Ind. at  367, 380 N.E.2d at  1228. 
38. Id. at 368-69, 380 N.E.2d at  1229. 
39. Id. 
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burdensome alternative~.~~ The court emphasized that "[tlhe 
statistics which are traditionally included on a driver's license, 
such as license number, height, weight, eye and hair color, have 
long proven adequate to enable the Bureau to fulfill its impor- 
tant duties."41 The court further stressed that few people would 
find it advantageous to seek an exemption in the first place since 
a photograph on a license is desirable for various business trans- 
actions such as cashing checks." Accordingly, an exemption for 
Pentecostal members provided an acceptable alternative since it 
would not undermine the asserted state interests? 
The Johnson court declined to follow Pentecostal House of 
Prayer and held that the photograph requirement for Colorado 
drivers licenses was not unconstitutional as applied to Assembly 
members. The court acknowledged the sincerity and religious 
nature of the Assembly members' belief and agreed that the 
photograph requirement imposed a burden on their free exercise 
of religion? Nonetheless, the court held that the state satisfied 
the requirements of the Sherbert test by demonstrating that 
compelling state interests were served by the photograph re- 
quirement and that no less burdensome alternative forms of reg- 
ulation were available. Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court 
concluded that an exemption for Assembly members would un- 
dermine the essential purposes of the photograph requirement." 
40. Id. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. To illustrate the difficulties encountered by the Indiana Supreme Court in 
applying the Sherbert test to free exercise claims, compare Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979). The court held that the state's de- 
nial of unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in an 
armaments plant for religious reasons did not violate the free exercise clause. The major- 
ity opinion attempted to distinguish Thomas from Pentecostal House of Prayer b y  stat- 
ing that a literal reading of the Bible prompted the Pentecostal belief, but it was unclear 
what prompted the Jehovah's Witness belief. Id. at 1133. Two justices dissented, con- 
tending that Sherbert required that the withholding of unemployment benefits from 
Thomas be declared unconstitutional. The dissent relied on Lincoln v. True, 408 F. 
Supp. 22 (W.D. Ky. 1975), which involved a fact situation similar to Thomas, as a proper 
interpretation of Sherbert. 391 N.E.2d at 1135 (Hunter, J., dissenting). 
44. 593 P.2d at 1364-65. 
45. Id. at 1365. 
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This analysis of the court's application of the Sherbert test 
to the facts in Johnson considers (1) the nature of the burden 
imposed on the Assembly members, and (2) the state's attempt 
to justify that burden. Special consideration ,will be given to the 
impact that an exemption for Assembly members would have on 
the state interests involved. 
A. The Burden on the Individual 
The Johnson court recognized that the photograph require- 
ment imposed a burden on the Assembly member's free exercise 
of religion? However, the court attempted to distinguish the 
nature of the burden imposed by the regulatory program in 
Johnson from that imposed in Sherbert.'? This distinction was 
apparently drawn to demonstrate why the burden in Johnson 
should be given less weight in balancing it against the state in- 
terests, thereby enabling the state interests to outweigh the indi- 
vidual's interest in the free exercise of religion. The statute in 
Sherbert granted an automatic exemption where religious beliefs 
precluded work on Sunday, whereas no such exemption was ex- 
tended to Sabbatarians. The photograph requirement in John- 
son involved no discrimination based on religion-every regular 
driving permit had to include the photograph of the licensee.48 
The distinction drawn by the Johnson court is superficial at 
best. The court should have looked more closely at the degree to 
which the photograph requirement interfered with the Assembly 
members' free exercise of religion rights. Had the court done so, 
it may well have decided that the burden was not only compara- 
ble to the burden in Sherbert, but in some respects more oner- 
ous. Similar to Sherbert, Johnson involved the deprivation of a 
government benefit because of the Assembly members' refusal to 
comply with the photograph requirement.'. Unlike the denial of 
46. Id. 
47. See id. at 1366. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1364. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that 
[elvery citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of 
the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the 
enjoyment of life and liberty. The limitations which may be placed upon this 
inherent right of the citizen must be based upon a proper exercise of the police 
power of the state in the protection of the public health, safety and welfare. 
Any unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of the individual to make use of 
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unemployment benefits in Sherbert, which is temporary, the re- 
fusal to issue Assembly members driving permits results in a 
permanent handicap of their mobility that could hinder both 
their employment opportunities and the fulfillment of their 
church duties. Because of this substantial infringement on the 
Assembly members' free exercise of religion, rather than mini- 
mizing the severity of the burden on the individual, the court 
should have placed a heavier burden on the state to satisfy its 
requirements under the Sherbert test. 
B. The Compelling State InterestlLeast Restrictive 
Alternative Test 
The Johnson court discussed three interests presented by 
the state that the photograph requirement served: (1) a photo- 
graph on a license facilitates the enforcement of highway safety 
by providing police officers with a ready means of verifying that 
the license belongs to the person presenting it, (2) negatives 
from the photos are filed by the Motor Vehicle Department and 
used in police photographic lineups and in identifying victims of 
natural disaster and traffic accidents, and (3) the state statuto- 
rily exempts from liability those who rely on drivers licenses for 
identification; the presence of a photograph on the drivers li- 
cense makes such reliance more dependable. The court found 
these interests to be compelling." 
In light of the significant burden imposed on Assembly 
members, it is arguable that these state interests do not out- 
weigh the burden or are not   om pel ling.^^ However, regardless of 
whether the state satisfies the first prong of its burden under the 
Sherbert test, the court should have held for the Assembly 
members because a less burdensome alternative exists. 
Sherbert demonstrates that an exemption to accommodate 
certain religious beliefs may be an adequate alternative when 
this accommodation does not prevent the state from substan- 
the public highways cannot be sustained. 
People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 214, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (1961). 
50. 593 P.2d at 1365-66. 
51. In Sherbert, the Court stated: "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational 
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive consti- 
tutional area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion 
for permissible limitation.' " 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
530 (1945)). Although the asserted state interests "rationally relate" to the photograph 
requirement, it is debatable just how "paramoun't" these interests are when weighed 
against the onerous burden imposed on Assembly members. 
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tially achieving its purposes.52 In holding that an exemption was 
not an adequate alternative to the photograph requirement, the 
Johnson court attempted to distinguish the impact that an ex- 
emption had on the state interests in Sherbert from the impact 
that it would have in Johnson. To allow Sherbert to receive un- 
employment benefits did not conflict with the underlying pur- 
pose of the statute which was to provide temporary relief for the 
involuntarily unernpl~yed.~~ Presumably Sherbert would eventu- 
ally find suitable work that did not require working on Satur- 
days. In contrast, the court found that "photographic identifica- 
tion is an indispensable underpinning of the purposes 
underlying the state's interest in issuing drivers licenses. To pro- 
vide exemptions would undermine its essential  purpose^."^ 
Unfortunately, the court failed to explain why an exemption 
would undermine the statute's essential purposes. Perhaps a 
closer scrutiny of the state interests involved would have found 
an exemption to be an adequate alternative. Indeed, the grant- 
ing of an exemption from the photograph requirement to Assem- 
bly members would only minimally affect those interests as- 
serted by the state. 
1. The state interest in enforcing highway safety 
The specific state interest served by the photograph re- 
quirement, which is to provide a means of ready identification of 
those who operate motor vehicles, is at most indirectly related to 
the enforcement of highway safety.55 As elucidated in Pentecos- 
tal House of Prayer, the presence of a photograph on a drivers 
52. 374 U.S. at 408-09. 
53. 593 P.2d at 1365. 
54. Id. 
55. The major purpose of driver licensing regulations is to further highway safety by 
promoting driver competence. The Colorado statutes provide: 
(1) No person, except those expressly exempted in section 42-2-102, shall drive 
any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid 
license prepared and issued by the department under this article. . . . (2) The 
department upon issuing a driver's license shall indicate thereon the type or 
general class of vehicles the licensee may drive. The department shall establish 
such qualifications as it deems reasonably necessary for the safe operation of 
the various types, sizes, or combinations of vehicles and shall appropriately 
examine each applicant to determine his qualifications, according to the type 
or general class of license for which he has applied. 
COLO. REV. STAT. 5 42-2-101 (1973). The prohibition against driving without a license 
and the issuance of various types of operator's licenses conditioned upon compliance 
with certain qualifications tends to restrict the use of the highways to competent drivers. 
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license is wholly unrelated to driving competen~e.~ After com- 
petence is established and a drivers license is issued, the actual 
enforcement of driving safety arises only as violations occur.67 
Police officers may stop traffic violators regardless of whether a 
photograph is on a license. 
Although Assembly members were willing to have their 
fingerprints and a complete physical description on their li- 
censes, the court determined that "the exigencies of law enforce- 
ment cannot brook the delay inherent in other means of identifi- 
cation."" However, just what exigencies require a photograph as 
opposed to these other means of identification is unclear since 
the court failed to define "exigencies of law enforcement." 
That certain classes of driving permits do not require pho- 
tographs indicates that to allow Assembly members to use per- 
mits without photographs would not significantly hinder the en- 
forcement of highway safety. Colorado driving licenses that do 
not require photographs on them include temporary and proba- 
tionary licenses." Also, temporary drivers of road machines or 
implements of husbandry need not obtain drivers licenses. Mili- 
tary personnel and nonresidents with valid drivers licenses from 
other states need not obtain Colorado drivers licenses, regardless 
of whether their out-of-state permits include  photograph^.^^ If 
these exceptions to the photograph requirement do not render 
the statutory scheme unworkable, it is difficult to understand 
how an exemption for Assembly members, a small religious 
group, would. The sounder view, stressed in Pentecostal House 
of Prayer, is that the physical characteristics traditionally de- 
scribed on a drivers license should be more than adequate to 
enable the state to fulfill its interest in promoting highway 
safety through identification of those who operate motor 
56. 269 Ind. at 368-69, 380 N.E.2d a t  1229. 
57. The Colorado Supreme Court held that a police officer can only demand the 
license of a driver whose vehicle has been stopped for otherwise valid purposes. Police 
officers do not have unlimited authority to stop any automobile at any time for any 
reason to request the display of a drivers license. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550 
P.2d 311 (1976). 
58. 593 P.2d at 1365. 
59. In response to the Assembly members' request for admissions, the Motor Vehi- 
cle Department admitted that licenses issued pursuant to sections 42-2-105 (temporary) 
and 42-2-123(11) (probationary) of the Colorado Revised Statutes do not require the 
licensee's photograph. Answer to Plaintiffs7 Request for Admissions, Johnson v. Motor 
Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979). 
60. See COLO. REV. STAT. 5 42-2-102 (1973). 
CASENOTES 
2. The state interest in the negatives 
The state interests served by the negatives obtained in tak- 
ing photographs for driving permits involve two aspects: (1) use 
in criminal identification procedures, and (2) identification of 
traffic accident and natural disaster victims.62 However, the Mo- 
tor Vehicle Division's refusal to issue a drivers license to an As- 
sembly member because of his failure to comply with the photo- 
graph requirement does not provide an alternate means of . 
obtaining the Assembly member's negative. The state's interests 
are frustrated, regardless of whether an Assembly member is 
permitted to receive a drivers license without submitting to the 
photograph requirement. Either way the state is not going to 
have the use of photographs of Assembly members. Thus, the 
state interest in using the negatives will not be furthered by re- 
fusing to issue drivers licenses without photographs to Assembly 
members? 
Even if the Assembly members had succumbed to the 
state's desires and complied with the photograph requirement in 
order to obtain driving permits, these state interests would only 
be minimally enhanced. Police photographic lineups can be ef- 
fectively administered without using any photographs of Assem- 
bly members. The negatives provided by other applicants for 
driving permits produce a sufticient pool from which to draw 
photographs for comparison with a criminal suspect's photo- 
graph. Also, if an Assembly member is a criminal suspect and 
has a prior record, his photograph is probably already on file 
and available for comparison in a photographic lineup. Should 
there be no photograph of a suspected Assembly member, the 
state could employ the same procedures used with certain other 
suspects for whom the state does not have a photograph, such as 
nonresidents or nondrivers. Procedures such as a police station 
showup can accomplish the same objectives as a photographic 
61. See 269 Ind. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229. 
62. 593 P.2d at 1365. 
63. It is also arguable that the interests served by the negatives are not so compel- 
ling as to outweigh the religious burden imposed by the photograph requirement. If 
negatives of Assembly members were essential for the accomplishment of these state 
interests, the state should require everyone to have their photographs taken whether 
they are applying for drivers licenses or not. Of course, such a proposition is ridiculous. 
See note 51 supra. 
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lineup without greatly burdening law enforcement resources." 
Regarding the state interest in identifying traffic accident or 
natural disaster victims, the state is not concerned with a means 
of immediate identification so much as it is with a reliable 
method of identification? Consequently, for the limited pur- 
poses asserted by the state, a complete physical description and 
fingerprint should suffice in most  instance^:^ and could be even 
more trustworthy in some cir~umstances.~~ 
3. The state interest in protecting those who rely on the 
license 
The statutory exemption from liability for reliance on driv- 
ers licenseses applies to any license issued pursuant to article 2 
of the Motor Licensing Regulations, including licenses that re- 
quire no photograph. By analogy, an exemption from the photo- 
graph requirement for Assembly members should not detract 
from this state interest. Indeed, parties could rely on an Assem- 
bly member's license in the same manner that they presently 
rely on other article 2 licenses that bear no photograph. 
Furthermore, no one is required to actually rely on any li- 
cense. If someone refused to rely on an Assembly member's li- 
64. A station showup may be more time consuming than a photographic lineup; 
therefore, it will normally be used only in those rare instances in which no photograph 
exists for the suspected Assembly member. An Assembly member suspected of criminal 
conduct can be subjected to a police station showup without invoking any formal indict- 
ment procedures. Also, an accused is not entitled to representation of counsel under the 
sixth amendment if the showup takes place at a police station before the accused has 
been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense. Kirby v. Illinois, 
406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
65. Brief for Appellee a t  7, Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 
1979). The state did not assert that it had an interest in the negatives in order to make 
immediate identifications of traffic accident and natural disaster victims. Even if the 
state had asserted this interest, an exemption for Assembly members would not hamper 
the state's use of the negatives in immediately identifying the vast majority of victims. In 
the rare situation where an Assembly member was a victim, his identity could be deter- 
mined by using the same procedures that the state employs to identify other victims for 
whom the state does not have a photograph. Furthermore, the Assembly member who 
may be subject to a delay in his identification would rather be confronted with this pos- 
sibility than have his picture taken. 
66. For information on the reliability of fingerprinting, see A. MOENSSENS, FINGER- 
PRINTS AND THE LAW 108-203 (1969). See generally R. FOOTE, FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICA- 
TION: A SURYEY OF PRESENT TECHNOLOGY, AUTOMATED APPLICATION AND POTENTIAL FOR 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT (Criminal Justice Monograph Vol. V, No. 2, 1974). 
67. See State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948) (decomposed corpse iden- 
tified solely through use of fingerprints). 
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-112(5) (1973). 
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cense because it bore no photograph, the only person injured 
would be the Assembly member. As emphasized in Pentecostal 
House of Prayer, it is to a person's advantage to possess a li- 
cense with a photograph for business transactions such as cash- 
ing Therefore, unlike Braunfeld where an exemption 
could possibly have encouraged others to seek exempted sta- 
tus,1° few persons would desire to seek an exemption from the 
photograph requirement unless for bona fide religious reasons. 
The asserted state interest in protecting those relying on li- 
censes, like the other interests previously discussed, can be suffi- 
ciently safeguarded while granting a religious exemption to As- 
sembly members. Consequently, the court should not have found 
that the state met the second prong of its burden under the 
Sherbert test which requires a showing that there is no alterna- 
tive that is less restrictive of the free exercise of religion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Johnson, the Colorado Supreme Court correctly recog- 
nized that the photograph requirement for drivers licenses in- 
fringed upon the Assembly members' free exercise of religion. 
However, the court erroneously concluded that the state satis- 
fied its two-pronged burden under the Sherbert test. Since an 
exemption from the photograph requirement for Assembly 
members would be an acceptable less-burdensome alternative, 
the court should have found the application of the photograph 
requirement to Assembly members to be an unconstitutional vi- 
olation of the free exercise of religion clause. 
Lynn R. Ledbetter 
69. 269 Ind. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229. 
70. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 609. 
